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Of Plates and Shapes: An Antitrust Vignette
Victor H. Kramer*
One of the events that persuaded Congress to toughen sec-
tion 7,1 the anti-merger provision of the Clayton Antitrust Act,
was the 1948 decision of the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 2 a case brought by the An-
titrust Division of the Justice Department against a subsidiary
of United States Steel Corporation. That case might never have
been brought but for a strong conflict in personality combined
with a philosophical difference over antitrust enforcement pol-
icy existing between President Truman's Attorney General and
the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Divi-
sion. This vignette relates the circumstances surrounding the
filing of that case, the outcome of which played a significant
role in the subsequent enactment of a tougher antimerger
amendment.3
The need for amendment of the Clayton Act became appar-
ent soon after its adoption in 1914.4 As originally enacted, sec-
tion 7 of the Act made unlawful the acquisition by corporations
of the capital stock of other corporations when such acquisition
would restrain trade.5 The original statute did not, however,
make illegal the corporate control of competitors through ac-
quisition of a corporation's assets rather than its stock.6 Corpo-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Events not sup-
ported by citations in the footnotes are based on the author's recollection.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
2. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
3. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.33 (1962).
4. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977)). The Clayton Act was a major plank in President
Wilson's "New Freedom" program of political reform. Cf. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10,
1912, at 8, col. 3 (announcing the completion of the manuscript of Wilson's book,
THE NEW FREEDOM). President Wilson regarded section 8 of the Act, which
prohibited certain interlocking directorships, as the most important provision.
See A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 401 (1946); Kramer, Interlocking
Directorships and the Clayton Act After 35 Years, 59 YALE L.J. 1266 (1950); Spe-
cial Address to Congress by President Wilson (Jan. 20, 1914), reprinted in 1 THE
NEW DEMOCRACY 81 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Wilson Address].
5. See note 7 infra. See generally United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
6. President Wilson was also concerned about acquisitions by individuals
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rate lawyers soon discovered this loophole and proceeded to
advise clients to acquire control by simply purchasing the as-
sets instead of the capital stock of competitors and customers. 7
As deficiencies in the Act became apparent, in part as the
result of Supreme Court opinions strictly interpreting section
7,8 the Federal Trade Commission, and subsequently the Anti-
trust Division, began to recommend legislation to close the
loopholes.9 These recommendations alone, however, did not
persuade Congress to make the suggested amendments. The
changes did not occur until 1950, after the decision in Columbia
Steel and about twenty-five years after the Federal Trade Com-
mission had first requested the changes.
In 1946, United States Steel Corporation sought to purchase
from the War Assets Administration a government-owned plant
in Geneva, Utah.'0 U.S. Steel's acquisition of the Geneva plant
was strongly opposed by Wendell Berge, head of the Antitrust
Division who so advised his superior, Tom Clark, the Attorney
General of the United States.
By 1946, however, Clark and Berge were not getting along.
The bad blood between them began a few years earlier when
former Attorney General Biddie switched Berge, who was then
the head of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, and
Clark, who was the head of Antitrust. In other words, Berge
got Antitrust and Clark got the less prestigious Criminal Divi-
sion. Biddle, who did not respect Clark," had received the
of controlling stock interests in competing corporations. Congress, however, ig-
nored this issue by limiting section 7 to acquisitions by corporations of capital
stock. Wilson Address, supra note 4, at 87.
7. Moreover, it was widely assumed, even by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, that the original section 7 applied only to acquisitions of the capital stock
of competitors and not customers. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 313 & n.21 (1962). This assumption derived from the fact that the lan-
guage of the original section 7 prohibited capital stock acquisition by corpora-
tions "engaged in commerce .... where the effect... may be to substantially
lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the
corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce." Clayton
Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)).
After section 7 was amended in 1950, see note 29 infra and accompanying text,
the Supreme Court held that the original section did apply to the acquisition of
a customer's capital stock. United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353
U.S. 586 (1957).
8. See Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
291 U.S. 587 (1934); Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S.
554 (1926).
9. For a review of these recommendations, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962).
10. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 503-06 (1948).
11. See F. BIDDLE, IN BRiEF AuTHorr 365-66 (1962).
[Vol. 64.143
ANTITRUST VIGNETTE
blessing for this game of musical chairs by contacting Senator
Tom Connally of Texas, the all-powerful Chairman of the Judi-
ciary Committee. Connally had quickly given his approval,
without understanding that the result was a demotion for his
proteg6, Clark.12
It is against this background that the sale of the Geneva
plant must be considered. While consideration of the sale was
being debated within the Truman Administration in early 1946,
a strike was called by the United Steel Workers.13 Truman des-
perately wanted the strike settled and it was rumored that U.S.
Steel's price was permission to acquire the Geneva plant. This
could only be achieved if the Attorney General gave an opinion
that the acquisition would not be contrary to antitrust law and
policy.14 Over Berge's strong objections, Clark furnished the
requested opinion on June 17, 1946.1
About eight months later, U.S. Steel announced its inten-
tion to acquire, through its subsidiary, Columbia Steel Com-
pany, the assets of Consolidated Steel Company,' 6 a West
Coast manufacturer that fabricated steel plates and shapes into
bridges, tanks, welded pipe, and other products. The an-
nouncement came at a time when the Antitrust Division felt
frustrated over its seeming inability to take any action to pre-
vent or slow the post-war merger boom, which was then gather-
ing momentum. This frustration resulted largely from the
loophole in section 7 of the Clayton Act, a loophole that did not
prevent control by acquisition of a corporation's assets. Be-
cause of this deficiency in section 7, the author suggested to
Berge that the Division might use the Sherman Act in an at-
tempt to block the merger. Berge dispatched a telegram to U.S.
Steel suggesting a meeting and stating that the proposed Con-
solidated Steel acquisition raised serious antitrust questions.
U.S. Steel was very likely aware of the conflict between
Clark and Berge. Accordingly, company officials responded di-
rectly to Clark and a meeting was arranged in the Attorney
General's office. Representing U.S. Steel were Irving Olds,
12. Formal consent of the Senate was not required because the Senate had
previously confirmed the appointments of both Berge and Clark as Assistant
Attorneys General.
13. See 1 H. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS 498-500 (1955).
14. See Surplus Property Act of 1944, ch. 479, § 20, 58 Stat. 765, 775 (re-
pealed 1949).
15. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 505 (1948).
16. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1947, at 35, col 6.
19791
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Chairman of the Board of Directors; Ben Fairless, President;
and Nathan Miller, a former Governor of New York and the
Corporation's General Counsel. The Antitrust Division was
represented by Berge; Holmes Baldridge, Chief of the General
Litigation Section; Harold Wein, an economist; and the au-
thor.17 The meeting was held in the Attorney General's outer
office, a huge, handsomely furnished room. 18
The three representatives from U.S. Steel formed a semi-
circle in front of Attorney General Clark, who was seated be-
hind the only desk in the room. Governor Miller did most of
the talking. In fact, he spoke for nearly an hour without notes.
The Governor reminded the Attorney General that the Govern-
ment had permitted U.S. Steel to acquire the Geneva plant and
argued that the Corporation had to be assured an outlet for the
basic unfinished steel produced there.19 Acquisition of Consoli-
dated Steel would give U.S. Steel the assurance of such an out-
let. The Governor's argument was as bold as it was candid.
Purporting to conclude that the prior acquisition of the Geneva
plant supported the acquisition of Consolidated Steel, he actu-
ally articulated the classic reason for opposing such downward
vertical mergers: they may lessen competition by hindering the
ability of the acquiring company's competitors to sell their
products to the acquired company.20
Following Governor Miller's presentation, President Fair-
less offered reasons for permitting the acquisition that, while
impressive in the clarity of their expression, contributed little
to the Governor's argument. Toward the end of the meeting,
Attorney General Clark promised to notify U.S. Steel promptly
of the Justice Department's decision regarding whether or not
to file suit to prevent the merger. When the meeting adjourned,
Clark retired behind a curtain that separated the outer office
from his private office and summoned Berge to follow.
The other Antitrust Division lawyers left the room fearing
17. Others, including George Haddock, Assistant Chief of the General Liti-
gation Section of the Antitrust Division, may also have been present.
18. While waiting for the Attorney General to enter from his inner sanc-
tum-a more modest-sized corner room adjoining the main office-the author
found himself seated on a sofa next to Mr. Olds. Olds was a precisely dressed,
highly polished gentleman, more reminiscent of an ambassador than a busi-
nessman. The author recalls nervously using the time until the Attorney Gen-
eral arrived to discuss with Mr. Olds the quality and beauty of the office's vast
rug, which appeared to approximate the size of a football field.
19. The argument was repeated by President Fairless during the ensuing
litigation. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 506 (1948).
20. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND Eco-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 69-70, 85-88 (1971).
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that the Attorney General would decide not to file the suit.
From the beginning of his term as Attorney General, Clark had
not given the staff reason to believe that he would support vig-
orous antitrust enforcement.21 For example, early in his term
he ordered that all Antitrust Division investigations would be
conducted by the FBI. This was somewhat of a coup for FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover, who had sought control over antitrust
investigative work for some time. FBI agents, however, were
notoriously unexcited by the comparatively dull work involved
in investigating antitrust violations. Moreover, the agents were
not trained in the subtleties of antitrust law, and, as might be
expected, did not do a particularly imaginative job in con-
ducting the investigations. Accordingly, many of the Antitrust
Division staff lawyers regarded the Clark order as a disaster
that would seriously impede effective enforcement of the anti-
trust laws.
Given this background, the Antitrust Division staff was un-
derstandably surprised when, just a few minutes after the
meeting with the U.S. Steel representatives had ended, Berge
told the staff about the Attorney General's decision. In es-
sence, Clark had ordered Berge to file suit immediately and
suggested that he put his best man on it. Clark appeared to be
furious at U.S. Steel, and with good reason. The dire predic-
tions that Berge had made prior to U.S. Steel's acquisition of
the Geneva plant had materialized. Clark had approved an ac-
quisition that led to the very anticompetitive consequences
against which Berge-Clark's former rival-had warned.
Attorney General Clark, in authorizing the suit, approved a
complaint that went far beyond any previous action. Essen-
tially, the Justice Department's suit constituted an effort to ex-
tend the Sherman Act beyond its existing boundaries to
embrace mergers that, in spite of the anticompetitive effects,
did not even approach monopolization.22 In retrospect, it ap-
pears that Clark was motivated by a desire to demonstrate to
21. After he was elevated to the Supreme Court, most of Justice Clark's
opinions and votes favored the plaintiffs position in antitrust cases. For exam-
ples of his antitrust opinions, see United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378
U.S. 158 (1964); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 275 (1963) (dis-
senting opinion); United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29
(1963); International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959); and
Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951). But see
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
22. The suit had a few precedents involving railroads, but these cases were
1979]
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his critics that he was as vigorous a trustbuster as was Assis-
tant Attorney General Berge.
Berge's "best man" turned out to be Robert Llewelyn
Wright, the son of the famous architect. Earlier in his career as
a senior attorney in the Antitrust Division, Wright had
shepherded through the district courts complex and difficult
antitrust suits against motion picture distributors and produc-
ers.23 Wright promptly instituted the suit against the U.S. Steel
subsidiary, lost the case after trial,24 and filed a direct appeal to
the Supreme Court. The Government's argument was
presented by Solicitor General Perlman and the Corporation's
argument was made by Governor Miller.
Perlman, although a fine man and a popular Solicitor Gen-
eral, made a very poor argument. He appeared to be unpre-
pared, even having difficulty placing the Geneva plant in the
correct state. Not long after he began his remarks, the Solicitor
General stated that, at the time of the acquisition of the Ge-
neva plant, U.S. Steel had made a "solemn agreement" not to
acquire any other steel companies. Chief Justice Vinson
reached for his copy of the record and asked the Solicitor Gen-
eral what page of the record contained the agreement. Perlman
responded, "Oh, Mr. Chief Justice, the agreement was not in
writing, but it was a solemn promise," or words to that effect.
The Chief Justice put his copy of the record down and, by his
facial expression and posture, indicated a lack of any further
interest in what the Solicitor General might have to say by way
of argument. In contrast to the poor presentation by the Solici-
tor General, Governor Miller made a brilliant argument which
held the full attention of the Court.
In a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court decided against
the United States. The majority opinion was written by Justice
Stanley Reed, widely known as a "swing" Justice. Justice
Reed's opinion first considered the acquisition's vertical effects:
the alleged elimination of competition between U.S. Steel and
its competitors in supplying steel to Consolidated for further
fabrication. The opinion concluded that "vertical integration, as
brushed aside by the Court's opinion in the Columbia Steel case. See United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 531 (1948).
23. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323, modified
per curiam, 70 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); United States v. Schine Chain Thea-
tres, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 229 (W.D.N.Y. 1945); United States v. Crescent Amuse-
ment Co., 31 F. Supp. 730 (M.D. Tenn. 1943), affd in part, rev'd in part, 323 U.S.
173 (1944).
24. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 74 F. Supp. 671 (D. Del. 1947),
affd, 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
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such without more, cannot be held violative of the Sherman
Act.' '2 The opinion then proceeded to outline the factors on
which the reasonableness of a vertical acquisition should be
judged, and found that the Consolidated Steel acquisition com-
plied with the tests. It was not unreasonable, primarily be-
cause the acquisition did not restrain enough trade.26 Finally,
Justice Reed addressed the horizontal effects of the alleged
elimination of competition between U.S. Steel and Consoli-
dated Steel in the manufacture of pipe and certain fabricated
steel products. Again the opinion concluded that the acquisi-
tion would not eliminate enough competition to constitute an
unreasonable restraint of trade.27
The Antitrust Division fully expected the Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Columbia Steel Co. to be a serious
blow to its hopes of slowing the merger movement. In fact, the
decision had the opposite effect. It gave a powerful argument
for a new statute to those members of Congress who had been
trying to amend section 7 of the Clayton Act in order to tighten
its strictures against mergers. 28 They argued that, in light of
the Supreme Court's strict interpretation, there was need for
an amended statute expressly prohibiting a merger or acquisi-
tion that would probably result in a substantial lessening of
competition in any line of commerce. Such a merger or acquisi-
tion should be prohibited, the congressmen argued, whether it
was vertical or horizontal, whether it would have national or
only sectional anticompetitive effects, and whether the merger
was achieved through the acquisition of capital stock, the ac-
quisition of assets, or otherwise.
The proposed amendments to section 7 were enacted in
1950.29 By 1962, the Supreme Court was interpreting the new
law so as to render the government's attack on horizontal merg-
ers "the major success of antitrust enforcement policy since
1950. " 30 The interplay of personality and will between two able
25. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525 (1948).
26. Id. at 526-27.
27. Id. at 529-30.
28. See 96 CONG. REC. 16502 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
11 (1949).
29. See Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1976)).
30. Address by Federal Trade Commissioner Pitofsky, 12th New England
Antitrust Conference, in Boston (Dec. 1978), reported in [1978] ANTrrRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 892, at A-24.
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and ambitious government lawyers-Tom Clark, the Attorney
General, and Wendell Berge, the Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Antitrust Division-had indirectly played a part
in persuading Congress to amend section 7 of the Clayton Act
in a way that was to have a profound effect on the future mar-
ket structure in America.
